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Abstract We develop a framework that allows us to reproduce the
generalised agreement theorem of Samet (2010), and extend it to models in
which agents can base their decisions on false information, while highlight-
ing the features that distinguish the result from the classic theorems found
in the literature. For example, it allows decisions to be based on interactive
information, and imposes no requirements on the language in which
the states are described. Finally, we produce a result that does not re-
quire Samet’s assumption of the existence of a completely uninformed agent.
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1 Introduction
The agreement theorem of Aumann (1976) states that if agents have a common
prior, then if their posteriors on some event are common knowledge, these poste-
riors must be equal, even if the agents’ updates are based on diﬀerent information.
This was proved for posterior probabilities in the context of a partitional informa-
tion structure.
This result was extended by many authors to generalised decision functions, in-
stead of posterior probabilities (see Cave (1983), Bacharach (1985), Moses and
Nachum (1990), Bonanno and Nehring (1998), Aumann and Hart (2006)). How-
ever, all these generalisations have relied on the imposition of some version of
the Sure-Thing Principle as a condition on the decision functions. Informally, all
0Department of Economics, University of Oxford, bassel.tarbush[at]economics.ox.ac.uk
I would like to thank John Quah for invaluable help and Francis Dennig for very useful discussions.
1
versions of this principle attempt to capture the following intuition: “If I would
perform some action when I know that p is the case, and I would perform the same
action when I know that p is not the case, then I should also perform that same
action when I do not know whether p is the case”.
Samet (2010) also derives a generalised agreement theorem in a partitional
information structure. However, his approach diﬀers significantly from the classic
examples in the literature in that he does not use a standard version of the Sure-
Thing Principle. Rather, Samet assumes an “interpersonal” Sure-Thing Principle
(ISTP ) which can informally be stated as: “If I have some information, but I know
that whatever information I have about something, you will be better informed
about it than me, then if I know your action, I should perform that same action”.
So, unlike the standard versions of the principle, which are conditions over the
decision function of a single agent, the ISTP is a condition imposed on the actions
across agents.
To obtain his result, Samet also requires the existence of a “dummy” agent, who
is an agent that is less informed than all other agents.
Given this, we can provide an informal statement of Samet’s result.
If the ISTP holds and there exists a dummy agent, then if the ac-
tions of all the agents are common knowledge, then their actions are
identical.
We develop a syntactic framework, using concepts from epistemic logic, which
allows us to reproduce Samet’s result in a partitional information structure. How-
ever, we are also able to keep track of some more subtle features of the result. For
example, we show that Samet’s result allows for actions to be based on interactive
knowledge, whereas standard results require them to be independent of such in-
formation. Furthermore, we extend Samet’s result to a non-paritional information
structure. Partitional information structures imply that agents can only know
what is the case; in other words, agents cannot base their actions on false infor-
mation. But surely, it is perfectly plausible for rational agents to do so. So our
extension eﬀectively states that agents cannot agree to disagree even when their ac-
tions are based on interactive knowledge (or belief) and possibly false information.
In section 2, we introduce the basic concepts that we use from epistemic logic.
In section 3, we expand the standard epistemic logic framework to agents perform-
ing actions, and we state our main assumptions. We derive our main results in
partitional models in section 4, and in non-partitional models in section 5. In the
latter section, we also derive an agreement theorem that replaces Samet’s assump-
tion about the existence of a dummy agent with an alternative one. All proofs are
in the appendix.
2
2 Epistemic Logic
This section introduces concepts from epistemic logic. All the definitions and
results in this section are standard (e.g. see Chellas (1980) and van Benthem
(2010) for general reference).
Definition 1 (Basic syntax). Define a finite set of atomic propositions, P , which
consists of all propositions that cannot be further reduced. Let N denote the set
of all agents. We then inductively create all the formulas in our language, L, as
follows:
(i) Every p ∈ P is a formula.
(ii) If ψ is a formula, so is ¬ψ.
(iii) If ψ and φ are formulas, then so is ψ ◦ φ, where ◦ is one of the following
Boolean operators: ∧, ∨, →, or ↔.
(iv) If ψ is a formula, then so is •ψ, where • is one of the modal operators ￿i∈N
or CG⊆N .
(v) Nothing else is a formula.
Note that ￿i and CG are modal operators, while ¬,∧,∨,→,↔ are the standard
Boolean operators.
Definition 2 (Modal depth). The modal depth md(ψ) of a formula ψ is the
maximal length of a nested sequence of modal operators. This can be defined
by the following recursion on our syntax rules: (i) md(p) = 0 for any p ∈ P , (ii)
md(¬ψ) = md(ψ), (iii) md(ψ ∧ φ) = md(ψ ∨ φ) = md(ψ → φ) = md(ψ ↔ φ) =
max(md(ψ),md(φ)), (iv) md(￿iψ) = 1 +md(ψ), (v) md(CGψ) = 1 +md(ψ).
So far, we have pure uninterpreted syntax. However, we can now introduce our
semantics, to determine the truth or falsity of formulas.
Definition 3 (Kripke semantics). A frame is a pair ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿, where Ω is a finite,
non-empty set of states (or “possible worlds), and Ri ⊆ Ω×Ω is a binary relation
for each agent i, also called the accessibility relation for agent i. A model on a
frame ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿, is a triple M = ￿Ω, Ri∈N ,V￿, where V : P × Ω → {0, 1} is a
valuation map.
Definition 4 (Truth). We say that a proposition p ∈ P is true at state ω in model
M = ￿Ω, Ri∈N ,V￿, denoted M,ω |= p, if and only if V(p,ω) = 1. Truth is then
extended inductively to all other formulas ψ as follows:
(i) M,ω |= ¬ψ if and only if it is not the case that M,ω |= ψ.
(ii) M,ω |= (ψ ∧ φ) if and only if M,ω |= ψ and M,ω |= φ.1
(iii) M,ω |= ￿iψ if and only if ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ then M,ω￿ |= ψ.
1The truth of formulas involving the other Boolean operators are similarly defined.
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(iv) M,ω |= CGψ if and only if ∀ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), M,ω￿ |= ψ.
The component of ω, ΩG(ω), is the set of all states that are accessible from ω in a
finite sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps.
Note that if M,ω |= CGψ, then one can generate any formula of finite modal
depth of the form ￿i￿j...￿rψ with i, j...r ∈ G, and this formula will be true at ω
in model M.2
Definition 5 (Validity). Formula ψ is valid in a modelM, denotedM |= ψ if and
only if ∀ω ∈ Ω in M, ω |= ψ. Formula ψ is valid in a frame ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿, denoted
￿Ω, Ri∈N￿ |= ψ, if and only if ∀M over ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿, M |= ψ. Formula ψ is T -valid
(or valid), denoted |= ψ, if and only if ∀￿Ω, Ri∈N￿ ∈ T (T , a collection of frames),
￿Ω, Ri∈N￿ |= ψ.
We can identify classes of frames by the restrictions that we impose on the
accessibility relations.
Definition 6 (Conditions on frames). We say that a frame ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿ is,
Reflexive if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω,ωRiω
Symmetric if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω,ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ then ω￿Riω
Transitive if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω,ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ and ω￿Riω￿￿ then ωRiω￿￿
Euclidean if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω,ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ and ωRiω￿￿ then ω￿Riω￿￿
Serial if ∀i ∈ N, ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃ω￿ ∈ Ω,ωRiω￿
The system S5 consists of all frames that are reflexive, symmetric and tran-
sitive; and the system KD45 consists of all frames that are serial, transitive and
Euclidean. The following formulas are validities in the respective frames, and in
fact, the systems can be axiomatised in the sense that if the validities are assumed
then they imply the desired restrictions on the accessibility relations:
S5 axioms KD45 axioms Axiom names
￿i(ψ → φ)→ (￿iψ → ￿iφ) ￿i(ψ → φ)→ (￿iψ → ￿iφ) Distribution
￿iψ → ψ ￿iψ → ¬￿i¬ψ Veracity; Consistency
￿iψ → ￿i￿iψ ￿iψ → ￿i￿iψ Positive introspection
¬￿iψ → ￿i¬￿iψ ¬￿iψ → ￿i¬￿iψ Negative introspection
2Note that the definition of the operator CG is drawn from van Benthem (2010), where it is also
mentioned that an alternative definition can be given: One can define a new accessibility relation
R∗G for the whole group G as the reflexive transitive closure of the union of all separate relations
Ri (i ∈ G), and then simply let M,ω |= CGψ if and only if ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωR∗Gω￿ then M,ω￿ |= ψ.
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It is standard to take the axioms of S5 as describing properties of (a rather strong
notion of) knowledge. Thus, in S5, ￿iψ is interpreted as “agent i knows that
ψ”. In KD45 however, since veracity is dropped in favour of consistency, we are
in a system in which to “know” that something is the case does not imply that
it is true. The axioms of KD45 are thus rather seen as describing properties
of a belief operator, so ￿iψ is interpreted as “agent i believes that ψ”. These
two systems mirror the patitional and non-partitional structures mentioned in the
introduction.3
Similarly, the operator CGψ is interpreted as “it is common knowledge to all the
agents in G that ψ” in S5, and as “it is common belief to all the agents in G that
ψ” in KD45.
3 Models with information and decisions
Let P be a finite set of atomic propositions. Since P is finite, its closure under the
standard Boolean operators, denoted P ∗, is tautologically finite.4 So P ∗ is just the
set of all possible inequivalent formulas that can be created out of the propositions
in P and the Boolean operators. Let Ψr0 be the set of all possible modal formulas
that can be generated from P ∗ with modal depth 0 up to r for an arbitrary r ∈ N0.
Again, since P ∗ is finite, so is Ψr0, so |Ψr0| = m, for some m ∈ N; and note that
Ψ00 = P
∗.5
Definition 7 (New operators). For each agent i ∈ N create a set of modal
operators, Oi = {￿i, ￿ˆi, ￿˙i}, where for every formula ψ, ￿ˆiψ := ￿i¬ψ and
￿˙iψ := ¬(￿iψ ∨ ￿ˆiψ).
The interpretation, for example in S5, is that ￿ˆiψ stands for “agent i knows that
it is not the case that ψ”, and ￿˙iψ stands for “agent i does not know whether it is
the case that ψ”. There are similar counterpart interpretations in KD45.
Definition 8 (Kens). Order the set Ψr0 into a vector of length m: (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψm),
and for each agent i ∈ N , create the sets
Ui = {(ν1i ψ1 ∧ ν2i ψ2 ∧ ... ∧ νmi ψm)|∀n ∈ {1, ...,m}, νni ∈ Oi}
Vi = {νi ∈ Ui| |= ¬(νi ↔ (p ∧ ¬p))}
3The philosophical grounds for these systems originated in Hintikka (1962), and for an exten-
sive formal treatment, see Chellas (1980).
4In the sense that there is only a finite number of inequivalent formulas (so p and p∧ p count
as one).
5If P = {p, q}, then one can generate 20 inequivalent formulas: 2 from p alone, 2 from q alone
and 16 out of p and q together, so |P ∗| = 20.
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A ken (νi ∈ Vi) for agent i, describes i’s information concerning every formula in
Ψr0. So, calling νni ψn the nth entry of i’s ken, the formula νni ψn states - in S5 -
whether i knows that the formula ψn is the case, or knows that it is not the case,
or does not know whether it is the case.
Note that Vi is a restriction of Ui to the set of kens that are not logically equivalent
to a contradiction; so only the logically consistent kens are considered.6
The following lemma shows that at each state, there exists a ken for each agent
which holds at that state, and moreover, that any two diﬀerent kens must be
contradictory at any given state.
Lemma 1. (i) ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃νi ∈ Vi,ω |= νi, (ii) ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀νi, µi ∈ Vi, if νi ￿= µi then
ω |= ¬(νi ∧ µi).
By the above lemma, there is a unique ken in Vi that holds at a given state.
Definition 9 (Informativeness). Create an order ￿⊆ Vi × Vj for all i, j ∈ N . We
say that the ken νi is more informative than the ken µj, denoted νi ￿ µj, if and
only if whenever i knows that ψ then j either also knows that ψ or does not know
whether ψ, and whenever i does not know whether ψ, then so does j.7
Note that ￿ is not a complete order on kens. For example, consider any two kens
νi and µi for agent i, in which the nth entry is νnj ψn = ￿iψn and µnjψn = ￿ˆiψn.
These two kens would not be comparable with ￿.
Finally, note that νi ∼ µj denotes νi ￿ µj and µj ￿ νi; which is interpreted as νi
and µj carrying the same information, but seen from the perspectives of agents i
and j respectively.
Definition 10 (Actions). We will add formulas of the form dxi to our syntax,
which are read as “Agent i performs action x”.
We assume that there can only be one action for any given ken; and since
there is a unique ken that is true at any given state, there is a unique action per
state. Furthermore, we assume - uncontroversially - that if the same ken is true at
diﬀerent states, then the same action must be taken at those states.
3.1 Main assumption
We will assume that the Interpersonal Sure-Thing Principle is a formula, ISTP ,
that is valid in every model that we will consider.
6An example of a logically inconsistent ken would be one containing ￿ip, ￿iq and ￿i(p→ ¬q).
7Formally, (i) if νni ψn = ￿iψn then (µnj ψn = ￿jψn or µnj ψn = ￿˙jψn), (ii) if νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn
then (µnj ψn = ￿ˆjψn or µnj ψn = ￿˙jψn), and (iii) if νni ψn = ￿˙iψn then (µnj ψn = ￿˙jψn).
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Assumption 1 (Interpersonal Sure-Thing Principle - ISTP ). For all ω ∈ Ω,
ω |= (νi ∧ νj) ∧￿i(νj → νj ￿ νi)→ (￿i(dxj )→ dxi )
The above states that for any agents i and j, if i knows (believes) that j’s ken
is more informative than hers (νj ￿ νi), then if i knows (believes) that j performs
action x, then i performs action x. Note that this does not require i to know
(believe) j’s ken! Rather, it simply requires i to think that if j’s ken were νj -
whatever it may be - then this ken would be more informative than hers.
4 Results in S5
In S5, the accessibility relation Ri is an equivalence relation for each i ∈ N . Let
Ii(ω) = {ω￿ ∈ Ω|ωRiω￿} be the information cell of i at ω. One can verify that the
set Ii = {Ii(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} is a partition of the state space Ω.
The following lemma states that at any state in which the information cell of
agent i is a subset of agent j’s cell at that state, then j’s ken is more informative
than i’s ken at that state.
Lemma 2. For any ω ∈ Ω such that Ii(ω) ⊆ Ij(ω), if ω |= νi∧νj then ω |= νi ￿ νj.
We will require two further lemmas.
Lemma 3. ∀i ∈ G, ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω￿) = ΩG(ω).
Lemma 4. If for some ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿ |= νi, then for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿￿ |= νi.
Samet (2010) assumes that there always exists an “epistemic dummy”: An agent
whose information cell is equal to the entire component ΩG(ω).
Assumption 2 (Epistemic dummy). ∃h ∈ G, Ih(ω) = ΩG(ω).
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exists an epistemic dummy, ISTP holds, and
that the system is S5. Let G = {i, j, h} with h the epistemic dummy. Then,
|= CG(dxi ∧ dyj ∧ dzh)→ (x = y = z).
Note that there is a slight abuse of notation in the statement of the theorem
above. Technically, “=” is not part of our syntax, so x = y should not appear
anywhere. However, we simply use it as shorthand. Our results should really be
read as: |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj ∧ dzh)→ (dwi ∧ dwj ∧ dwh ), and w = z = x = y.
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4.1 Discussion
The intuition driving the result is that by assuming that there exists an epistemic
dummy, one is assuming that there is an agent h whose performed action is based
on a ken that is less informative than every other agents’. However, h knows the
performed actions of the other agents, and knows that those actions are based on
information that is more informative than her ken. She therefore models her choice
on the performed actions of each of the other agents. But if those more informed
agents were taking diﬀerent actions then she would have to simultaneously copy
two diﬀerent actions, which is impossible, thus the actions of the more informed
agents must be the same.
Note that the result would also hold if we had used this alternative version of
the dummy assumption:
Assumption 3 (Dummy*). There is an h ∈ G such that for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), if
ω￿ |= νh ∧ νi, then νi ￿ νh for all i ￿= h.
In fact, this assumption is weaker than the original epistemic dummy assump-
tion because in principle, it allows the dummy agent to have diﬀerent information
across diﬀerent states within the same component, whereas the original assump-
tion forces the dummy to have the same information across all states within a
component.
In Tarbush (2011) it is shown that previous agreement theorems require the
assumption that actions only be based on kens where Ψr0 is such that r = 0. That
is, actions cannot be based on interactive information.8 So, in previous results,
agents can agree to disagree if say i bases her decision on what she knows about
what j knows. However, one of the main distinguishing features of Samet’s result
is that this restriction does not need to be imposed.
Furthermore, when the “Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle” is imposed on decision func-
tions in previous results (which emulates Bacharach’s (1985) original condition),
the language must be assumed to be “rich” enough to guarantee that informa-
tion (or kens) are, in a sense, “disjoint”.9 The implication is that whether or not
the agreement results hold depends on the way in which the states are described!
However, again, Samet’s result requires no such condition.
8As explained in the paper, this is in response to the criticism (Moses and Nachum (1990))
of Bacharach (1985).
9The language in a component ΩG(ω) is rich if and only if for all i ∈ G, and any ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈
ΩG(ω) such that ω￿ |= νi, ω￿￿ |= µi and νi ￿= µi, there is n ∈ {1, ...,m} such that νni = ￿i and
µni = ￿ˆi.
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5 Results in KD45
We can now analyse the consequences of using a model for belief rather than
knowledge. So we impose a KD45 frame rather than an S5 frame.
Essentially, the only diﬀerence between knowledge and belief that we will consider
is that belief is not infallible. In S5, agents cannot know something that is false,
because reflexivity implies that if one knows that p at some state, then p must be
true at that state (Veracity). On the other hand, KD45 allows agents to believe
what is false, and thus to base decision on false information, by dropping reflex-
ivity. In fact, S5 = KD45 + reflexivity.
We can provide a description of the links between states in a KD45 frame:
Some sets of states within Ω are “completely connected”, in the sense that the
accessibility relation over states within such sets in an equivalence relation, so these
sets have the same properties as information cells in S5; and, for each one of these
completely connected sets there exists a (possibly empty) set of “associated” states
that have arrows pointing from them to every state in the completely connected
set, but with no arrow (by the same agent) pointing towards them. The set of
all completely connected sets and their set of associated states exhaust the state
space.
Formally, let Si(ω) = {ω￿ ∈ Ω|ωEiω￿}, where Ei is an equivalence relation. We
call this set of completely connected states the information sink of state ω for
player i. The set Si do not necessarily partition the state space, hence we have
a non-partitional model. Note, that this way of defining the sink guarantees that
if Si(ω) ￿= ∅ then ω ∈ Si(ω). Furthermore, we define ω’s set of associated states
as Ai(ω) = {ω￿￿ ∈ Ω|∀ω￿￿￿ ∈ Si(ω),ω￿￿Fiω￿￿￿}, where Fi is now a simple arrow. So,
note that now, for any agent i, we have that Ri = Ei ∪ Fi. Finally, we can define
Ji(ω) = Si(ω)∪Ai(ω), and note that Ji = {Ji(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} exhausts the entire state
space.
Proposition 1. The above is a complete characterisation of the KD45 state space.
We now use lemmas that are analogous to the ones used in S5.
Lemma 5. For any ω ∈ Ω such that Si(ω) ⊆ Sj(ω), if ω |= νi∧νj then ω |= νi ￿ νj.
Lemma 6. ∀i ∈ G, ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Si(ω￿) ⊆ ΩG(ω) ⊆ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω￿).
Lemma 7. If for some ω￿ ∈ Ji(ω), ω￿ |= νi, then for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω), ω￿￿ |= νi.
We now require an assumption that is analogous to the epistemic dummy as-
sumption.
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Assumption 4 (Doxastic dummy). ∃h ∈ G, ∃ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), such that for k ∈
G\{h}, ￿ω￿￿∈ΩG(ω) Sk(ω￿￿) ⊆ Sh(ω￿) and Jh(ω￿) = ΩG(ω) ∪ {ω}.
This assumption requires that some agent’s (the dummy’s) unique information
sink be a superset of the union of the information sinks of every other agent in the
component.
Theorem 2. Suppose that there exists a doxastic dummy, ISTP holds, and that
the system is KD45. Let G = {i, j, h} with h the doxastic dummy. Then, |=
CG(dxi ∧ dyj ∧ dzh)→ (x = y = z).
5.1 Discussion
The only substantial diﬀerence between theorem in S5 and the one is KD45 is the
assumption made about the dummy. Note that an alternative assumption could
have been: ∃h ∈ G, Sh(ω) = ΩG(ω) ∪ {ω}. One can verify that this implies the
doxastic dummy assumption. However, we see it as being unreasonably strong: It
implies that if the “actual” state ω is not in the sink of any of the agents other than
the dummy’s, then it must at least be in the dummy’s sink. In such a case, the
dummy would be somewhat of a “wise fool” in the sense that all other agents would
be deeming ω impossible, whereas the dummy does not rule out any possibility,
including ω itself. This implication does not necessarily hold when the doxastic
dummy assumption is taken as it is originally stated.
As before, the weaker assumption, Dummy*, would have suﬃced for the above
theorem to hold.
One rather worrying feature of Theorem 2, however, can be illustrated by the
following example. Consider model M in Figure 1 with ω |= p and ω￿ |= ¬p. At
every state of this model, i believes that ¬p and at every state, j believes that p.
In this model, the condition of “heterogeneity” fails, so all the agreement theorems
mentioned in the introduction would concede that i and j can agree to disagree (see
Tarbush (2011)).10 Now, consider adding an epistemic dummy h to this model, to
obtain model M￿. Heterogeneity would again fail, so the agents can again agree
to disagree according to all the agreement theorems other than Samet’s. However,
according to Theorem 2, the agents cannot agree to disagree. But what drives the
result in this case?
Agent i must surely perform his action as though he were certain that ¬p is
the case, since ¬p is the only proposition that i believes, regardless of the state.
10For all i ∈ G, if for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), we have ω |= νi, ω￿ |= µi and νi = µi, then for all
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), with ω￿ |= ν￿i ∧ ν￿j we have ν￿i ∼ ν￿j .
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ωi ￿￿
i
￿￿
ω￿ j
￿￿
j
￿￿ ⇒ ωi,h ￿￿
i
￿￿
￿￿ h ￿￿ ω￿ j,h
￿￿
j
￿￿
M M￿
Figure 1: M￿ =M plus dummy h
Similarly, agent j must surely perform her action as though she were certain that
p is the case. However, by the presence of h, the agents i and j must perform the
same action. So the existence of the dummy must collapse the action that one
would perform when p and when ¬p to the same action.
One can interpret this in one of two ways: (i) The existence of the dummy can be
seen as a constraint on the decision functions, requiring them to be independent of
one’s information regarding p. But this then makes agreement trivial. Or, (ii) the
decision functions do depend on p, but the existence of the dummy implies that
the more informed agents must nevertheless perform the same action. However,
this must be the action that the agents would perform when they do not “know”
whether p is true, even though, in this example, the more informed agents are
eﬀectively certain of their information regarding p.
We can now provide a further theorem without a doxastic dummy.
Definition 11. Condition (1.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there exists an
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω￿) = Sj(ω￿). Condition (1.b): For all ω ∈ Ω and
i, j ∈ G, there exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ω￿ |= νi ∧ νj for some νi, νj, such
that νi ∼ νj.11
Condition (1.a) states that in any component, there must exist a state in which
both agents have the same sink. Syntactically, condition (1.b) states that it must
not be commonly believed, among the agents, that they do not have the same
information. This condition can be seen as a requirement that there be a “grain
of agreement” among the agents - in the sense that there must exist some state
within each component in which the agents have the same information.
By Lemma 5, one can verify that condition (1.a) implies (1.b), however the converse
does not hold.
Theorem 3. Suppose that ISTP and condition (1.a) hold, and that the system is
KD45. Let G = {i, j}. Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
11These conditions are also discussed in Tarbush (2011).
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As a result of the assumption used, this theorem does not apply in the model
M￿ represented in Figure 1.
Furthermore, the result could be extended to more than two agents. We would
simply have to require the existence of a “grain of agreement” between pairs of
agents, enough to cover all agents. For example, if there are three agents i, j
and k, then we would need condition (1.a) to hold between say i and j and be-
tween j and k - but we would not require for it to hold between i and k for example.
In terms of limitations , it should be noted that condition (1.b) would not be
suﬃcient for the result. Also, the result does also apply in S5 - if we replace
sinks by cells in the statement of condition (1.a) - however, in such frames, it only
generates agreement in a trivial sense. Indeed, one can verify that condition (1.a),
with sinks replaced by cells, implies that all agents have the same information at
every state within a component, which renders agreement trivial.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 (i) Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, and suppose that
ω |= ψ, for some formula ψ ∈ Ψr0. It must be the case that either (i.a) ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if
ωRiω￿ then ω￿ |= ψ, or (i.b) ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ then ω￿ |= ¬ψ, or (i.c) ∃ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈ Ω,
such that ωRiω￿ and ωRiω￿￿, and ω￿ |= ψ and ω￿￿ |= ¬ψ (i.e. neither (i.a) nor (i.b)).
If (i.a) is the case, then ω |= ￿iψ. If (i.b) is the case, then ω |= ￿ˆiψ, and finally,
if (i.c) is the case, then ω |= ￿˙iψ. Therefore, in all cases, the operator over ψ
belongs to the set Oi, and since this holds for any ψ ∈ Ψr0, it holds for each entry
of a ken. Furthermore, |= can only generate consistent lists of formulas, so kens
cannot be inconsistent. This implies that a ken must exist that belongs to Vi.
(ii) Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. Let νi, µi ∈ Vi, and consider the nth
entry of each ken such that νni ψn ￿= µni ψn. Case (ii.a): Suppose ω |= νni ψn = ￿iψn.
So, ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿, then ω￿ |= ψn. By definition, this rules out the possibility
that also, ω |= ￿ˆiψn, or ω |= ￿˙iψn. For cases (ii.b), ω |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn, and (ii.c),
ω |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn, proceed analogously to (ii.a).
Proof of Lemma 2 Consider some arbitrary state ω ∈ Ω. Suppose Ii(ω) ⊆
Ij(ω) and ω |= νi ∧ νj. Consider the nth entry of these kens.
(a) Suppose ω |= νni ψn = ￿iψn, and suppose that ω |= νnj ψn = ￿ˆjψn. Then,
∀ω￿ ∈ Ij(ω), ω￿ |= ¬ψn. But if Ii(ω) ⊆ Ij(ω), then ∀ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿ |= ¬ψn, which
contradicts the statement that ω |= ￿iψn. Therefore, ω |= (νnj ψn = ￿jψn∨νnj ψn =
￿˙jψn).
Cases (b), ω |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn and (c) ω |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn can dealt with analogously
to case (a).
Proof of Lemma 3 Suppose ω￿￿ ∈ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω￿). So, ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿) for some
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). But, ω￿Riω￿￿, and there exists a sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps such that
ω￿ is reachable from ω. Therefore, there exists a sequence, one step longer, such
that ω￿￿ is reachable from ω. So, ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). (And, note that Ii(ω￿￿) ⊆ ΩG(ω)).
Suppose ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). Reflexivity guarantees that ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿￿). So, for some
ω∗ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω∗), so ω￿￿ ∈
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
￿).
Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose ω￿ |= νi for some ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω). Consider the nth
entry of the ken, namely, νni ψn.
(a) Suppose ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿iψn. Then, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, ω￿Riω￿￿ implies ω￿￿ |= ψn.
So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿), ω￿￿ |= ψn. But since Ri is an equivalence relation, and
ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω), it follows that Ii(ω￿) = Ii(ω). So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿￿ |= ψn, from
which it follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn.
Case (b), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn and (c), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn are analogous to case (a).
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Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose that there exists an epistemic dummy, ISTP
holds, and that the system is S5. Let ω ∈ Ω, and consider the set ΩG(ω). It must
be the case that at ω, ω |= νh for some νh. So by Lemma 4 and the existence of
an epistemic dummy, for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= νh. By Lemma 3, we know that￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
￿) = ΩG(ω). So for each state in each of i’s information cells, and
therefore for each ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) with ω￿￿ |= νi for some νi, it must be the case that
νi ￿ νh by Lemma 2. This is true at every state in the component, so in particular,
if ω |= ν ￿i then ω |= ￿h(ν ￿i → ν ￿i ￿ νh). (Agent h knows ν ￿i → ν ￿i ￿ νh because it
must be true at every state of the information cell Ih(ω)).
Finally, by the assumption that ω |= CG(dxi ), it follows that ω |= ￿h(dxi ). By
ISTP , it follows that ω |= dxh.
Reasoning similarly, between the dummy h and agent j, we find that ω |= dyh.
Therefore ω |= dxh ∧ dyh, which is not possible unless x = y.
Proof of Proposition 1 Let “i-arrow” refer to an arrow of i’s accessibility
relation. Firstly, we can show that Ri = Ei ∪ Fi. An arbitrary ω ∈ Ω either has
an i-arrow pointing to it or it does not. If it does not, by seriality, it points to
another state. If it does, then there exists a state ω￿ that points to ω which itself
points to some state ω￿￿ by seriality. Transitivity implies that ω￿ points to ω￿￿ and
Euclideaness implies that ω￿￿ points to ω. From here it is easy to prove that ω, ω￿
and ω￿￿ are in an equivalence class.
Secondly, we show that if Ji(ω￿) ￿= Ji(ω￿￿) then Ji(ω￿) ∩ Ji(ω￿￿) = ∅. Suppose
ω ∈ Ji(ω￿) ∩ Ji(ω￿￿). If ω ∈ Si(ω￿) ∩ Si(ω￿￿) then Si(ω￿) and Si(ω￿￿) are indis-
tinguishable, and one can verify that Ji(ω￿) = Ji(ω￿￿). If ω ∈ Si(ω￿) ∩ Ai(ω￿￿)
then ω both does have and does not have an i-arrow pointing to it. Finally, if
ω ∈ Ai(ω￿) ∩ Ai(ω￿￿) then by Euclideaness, ω￿ and ω￿￿ are indistinguishable, and
Ji(ω￿) = Ji(ω￿￿).
Thirdly, we can show that ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω) = Ω. Suppose ω￿ ∈ ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω), then by the
definitions of Si and Ai, ω￿ ∈ Ω. On the other hand, suppose ω ∈ Ω. Then if there
is an i-arrow pointing to ω, ω ∈ Si(ω) ⊆ Ji(ω). If there is no i-arrow pointing to
it, then by seriality, there is an ω￿ that ω points to, so ω ∈ Ai(ω￿) ⊆ Ji(ω￿). So,
ω ∈ ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω).
Proof of Lemma 5 Entirely analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 6 Suppose ω￿￿ ∈ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Si(ω￿). So, ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿) for some
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). But, ω￿Eiω￿￿, and there exists a sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps such
that ω￿ is reachable from ω. Therefore, there exists a sequence, one step longer,
such that ω￿￿ is reachable from ω. So, ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω).
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Suppose ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). Either ω￿￿ has an i-arrow pointing towards it, in which
case ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿￿). So, ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿￿) ∪ Ai(ω￿￿) = Ji(ω￿￿), or, ω￿￿ has no i-arrow
pointing towards it, in which case, by seriality, there exists some ω￿￿￿ such that
ω￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω￿￿￿). Note that ω￿￿￿ must be in ΩG(ω) since it is reachable from ω￿￿. So,
ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿￿￿)∪Ai(ω￿￿￿) = Ji(ω￿￿￿). In either case, for some ω∗ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω∗),
so ω￿￿ ∈ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω￿).
Proof of Lemma 7 Suppose ω￿ |= νi for some ω￿ ∈ Ji(ω). Firstly, suppose
ω￿ ∈ Si(ω), and consider the nth entry of the ken, namely, νni ψn.
(a) Suppose ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿iψn. Then, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, ω￿Eiω￿￿ implies ω￿￿ |= ψn.
So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿), ω￿￿ |= ψn. But since Ei is an equivalence relation, and
ω￿ ∈ Si(ω), it follows that Si(ω￿) = Si(ω). So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω), ω￿￿ |= ψn, from
which it follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω), ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn. Also, each ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω) has an
arrow pointing to each state in Si(ω), so for all ω∗ ∈ Si(ω), if ω￿￿￿Fiω∗, ω∗ |= ψn.
So, for all ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω), ω￿￿￿ |= ￿iψn. It follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω), ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn.
Case (b), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn and (c), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn are analogous to case
(a).
Now, suppose ω￿ ∈ Ai(ω), and consider the nth entry of the ken, namely, νni ψn.
(d) Suppose ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿iψn. Then, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, ω￿Fiω￿￿ implies ω￿￿ |= ψn.
So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿), ω￿￿ |= ψn. This implies that ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω),
and ω￿￿￿ |= ￿iψn for all other states ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω). It follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω),
ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn.
Case (e), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn and (f), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn are analogous to case (d).
Proof of Theorem 2 Suppose that there exists a doxastic dummy, ISTP
holds, and that the system is KD45. Let ω ∈ Ω, and consider the set ΩG(ω). It
must be the case that at ω, ω |= νh for some νh. So by Lemma 7 and the existence
of a doxastic dummy, for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) ∪ {ω}, ω￿ |= νh. By Lemma 6, we know
that
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Si(ω
￿) ⊆ ΩG(ω). So for each state ω￿￿ in each of i’s information
sinks, it must be the case that ω￿￿ |= ν ￿￿i for some ν ￿￿i , and that ν ￿￿i ￿ νh by Lemma
5. However, this must also be true at every state ω￿￿￿ that is in the component but
not in any of i’s sinks (by Lemma 7); that is, at every state in ΩG(ω) ∪ {ω}. So,
in particular, if ω |= ν ￿i then ω |= ￿h(ν ￿i → ν ￿i ￿ νh). (Agent h knows ν ￿i → ν ￿i ￿ νh
because it must be true at every state of the information sink and associated state
Jh(ω)).
Finally, by the assumption that ω |= CG(dxi ), it follows that ω |= ￿h(dxi ). By
ISTP , it follows that ω |= dxh.
Reasoning similarly, between the dummy h and agent j, we find that ω |= dyh.
Therefore ω |= dxh ∧ dyh, which is not possible unless x = y.
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Proof of Theorem 3 If condition (1.a) holds, then without loss of generality,
there is some state ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ω￿ |= ν ￿i ∧ µ￿j for some ν ￿i, µ￿j and µ￿j ￿ ν ￿i
by Lemma 5, and ω￿ |= ￿iµ￿j. The latter is true because µ￿j is invariant across the
sink Sj(ω￿), but this is equal to Si(ω￿), so is invariant across this sink as well.
Now, suppose that ω |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj ). Firstly, dxi ∧ dyj must be true at any state ω￿￿
such that ωRiω￿￿, and since agent i’s kens are the same at ω and ω￿￿ (Lemma 7),
the actions must also be the same at those states, so (reasoning similarly for j) we
have ω |= dxi ∧ dyj . Secondly, at ω￿ itself, we have ω￿ |= ￿i(dyj ). By ISTP , we have
that ω￿ |= dyi . But by common belief, ω￿ |= dxi since it is also reachable from ω. So
ω￿ |= dxi ∧ dyi , which is not possible unless x = y; which also holds at ω itself.
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